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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, researchers have proposed a number of positioning and distance estimation techniques for wireless networks [l] . 121, [31, [41, [51, [6] . However, they all studied these techniques in non-adversarial settings. Distance estimation and positioning techniques are, nevertheless, highly vulnerable to attacks from compromised nodes and external attackers. Coinproniised nudes can report false position and distance information in order to cheat on their locations. External attackers can modify (spoof) the measured positions and distances of wireless nodes.
Few proposals for secure distance and location verification have already been proposed. Brands and Chaum [7] propose a distance bounding protocol that can be used to verify the proximity of two devices connected by a wired link. Sastry, Shankar and Wagner [SI propose a new distance bounding protocol, bitsed on ultrasound and radio wireless communication. Both proposals focused on the verification of the distance to a device, or on its presence in a region of interest. Poovendran and L a o s [91 proposed a set of techniques for secure positioning in sensor networks based on directional antennas. Kuhn 1101 proposed an asymmetric security mechanism for navigation signals. Both proposals address secure position computation by a node. but not secure position verification (typically by an authority).
In this work, we propose a mechanism for secure position computation and verification of positions of wireless devices. We call our mechanism Verifiable MultiIateration (VM). This mechanism is based on the measurements of the time of radio signal propagation (i.e.? time-of-flight (ToF)). Verifiable Multilateration consists of conventional multilaterarion with ' The work presented in this paper was supported (in part) b y distance bounding or distance estimation and enables verification of node positions by a sei of (at least three) base stations, which do not need to be tighdy synchronized.
In Verifiable Multilateration. we primarily make use of the distance bounding protocols; however, as we will show, Verifiable Multilateration can also be used with conventional radio frequency time-of-fligh t distance estimation techniques. We will show that by using conventional distance estimation instead of distance bounding, some security properties of the Verifiable Multilateration mechanism can siill be preserved.
Because of its generality, Verifiable Multilateration can be used to secure positioning in a variety of systems. In this work, we focus on sensor network positioning and we propose SPINE, a system for Secure Positioning In sensor NEtworks.
This system is based on Verifiable Multilateration and ensures secure positioning of sensors in the presence of adversaries.
We present a security and performance analysis of SPINE.
The organization of the rest of the paper is the following.
In Section 11, we provide a survey of positioning techniques and analyze attacks against them. In Section 111, we describe a technique for radio frequency distance bounding. In Sections IV, we describe our technique for position verification called Verifiable Multilateration (VM). In Section V, we present a scheme for secure positioning of a network of sensors. In Section VI, we present an overview of current proposals and techniques for positioning in wireless networks, based on Verifiable Multilateration. We conclude the paper in Section VII. ESTIMATION 
ATTACKS AGAINST POSITION AND DISTANCE

TECHNIQUES
We now review positioning and distance estimation techniques and analyze their vulnerabilities.
We first shortly present our attacker model. We call an attacker exlernul if the attacker cannot authenticate itself as an honest network node to other network nodes or to a central authority. We call a node conipromised if it is controlled by an attacker and it can authenticate itself to the authority and to other network nodes [111. We assume that when a node is compromised, its secret keys and other secrets that it shares with other nodes are known to the attacker.
A. Global Posilioning System (GPS)
The Global Positioning System is today the most widespread outdoor positioning system for mobile devices. The produce fake satellite radio signals that are stronger than the real signals coming from satellites. Most current GPS receivers are totally fooled, accepting these stronger signals while ignoring the weaker, authentic signals. GPS satellite simulators are legitimately used to test new GPS products and can be bought for $10k-%50k or rented for just $ Ik per month.
Some simple software changes to most GPS receivers would permit them to detect relatively unsophisticated spoofing attacks [ 121. Nevertheless, more sophisticated spoofing attacks would still be hard to detect. Military GPS are protected from position spoofing by codes which cannot be reproduced by the attackers. Recently. Kuhn 1101 proposed an asymmetric security mechanism for navigation signals that can be used to secure civilian GPS. This mechanism is, however, vulnerable to some sophisticated attacks involving jamming and fast wormholes.
Even if a mobile node is able to obtain its correct position from the GPS satellites, the authority or another mobile node have no way t~ verify the correctness of node's position, unless the mobile node is equipped with a trusted software or hardware module [13].
B. Ultrasound (US)
Ultrasound-based systems operate by measuring ToF of the sound signal measured between two nodes. An interesting feature of these systems i s that, if used with RF signals, they do not require any time synchronization between the sender and the receiver. The limitations of the US-based systems are that, due to outdoor interferences, US systems can be mainly used indoors, and that the US signals can be animal-unfriendly.
US-based systems are vulnerable to distance reduction and distance enlargement attacks by external attackers and compromised nodes. To reduce the measured distance between two honest nodes, two external nodes can use a fast radio 
C. Radio (RF)
In techniques based on the Received Signal Strength (RSS), the distance is computed based on the transmitted and received signal strengths. To cheat on the measured distance, a compromised node therefore only needs to report a false power level to an honest node. External attackers can also modify the measured distance beiween two honest nodes by jamming the nodes' mutual communication and by replaying the messages with higher or lower power strengths.
RF time-of-flight-based systems exhibit the best security properties, In these systems, nodes measure their mutual distance based on the time of propagation of the signal between them. Because RF signals travel at the speed of light, an external attackers can, by jamming and replaying the signals, only increase, but not decrease the measured time-of-flight between the nodes. A compromised node can further cheat on the distance by laying about the signal transmission and reception times.
An RF distance bounding technique proposed by Brands and Chaum 171 exhibits better security properties than conventional RF ToF distance estimation; it allows the nodes to upper bound their distances to other nodes, meaning that it prevents a compromised node from reducing the measured distance. As we will show in Section 111 in more detail, with F@ ToF distancebounding protocols, external attackers and compromised nodes can only increase, but not decrease the measured distances to honest nodes.
D. Conclusion
We conclude our review with the summary of vulnerabilities of positioning and distance measurement systems shown on The commitment scheme needs to satisfy two properties: (i) a user who commits to a certain value cannot change this value afterwards (we say that the scheme is binding), (ii) the commitment is hidden from its receiver until the sender "opens" it (we say that the scheme is hiding). A grams each.
In the case of a US-based distance bounding, node processing speed and clock accuracy can be of the order of milliseconds. Thus, US distance bounding can be easily implemented with off-the-shelf components such as microphones and 802.11 wireless cards [SI.
IV. VERIFIABLE MULTILATERATION
In Section 11, we described security problems related to various positioning and distance estimation techniques and in Section I11 we showed how the devices can upper-bound their mutual distances. We now propose a technique for position verification that we call Verijable Multilaterafiori (VM). This technique enables a secure computation and verification of the positions of mobile devices in the presence of attackers.
By secure position compiitation we mean that base stations compute a correct position of a node in the presence of attacker; by secure position verificalion we mean that the base stations verify a position reported by the node.
Multilateration is a technique for determining the position of a (mobile) device from a set of reference points whose positions are known, based on the distances measured between the reference points and the device. The position of the device in two (three) dimensions can be computed if the device measured its distance to three (four) reference points. As we already detailed in Section 11. distance estimation techniques are vulnerable to attacks from external attackers and from compromised nodes, which can maliciously modify the measured distances. Multilateration is equally vulnerable to the same set of attacks because it relies on distance esumations.
A. Algorirhm
Verifiable Multilateration relies on distance bounding. It consists of distance bound measurements from at least three reference points (verifiers) to the considered device (the claimant) and of subsequent camputations performed by an authority. For simplicity, we show the algorithm for two dimensiond positioning; at the end of this subsection, we briefly explain how a similar algorithm can be applied to the three dimensional case,
The intuition behind verifiable multilateration algorithm is the foollowing. Because of the distance bounding property, the claimant can only pretend that it is more distant from the verifier than it really is. If it increases the measured distance to one of the verifiers, to keep the position consistent, the claimant needs to prove that at least one of the measured distances to other verifiers is shorter than it actually is. which it cannot because of the distance bounding. This property holds only if the position of the claimant is determined within the triangle formed by the verifiers. This can be explained with a simple example: if an object is located within the triangle, and it moves to a different position within the triangle, it will certainly reduce its distance to at least one of the triangle vertices. The same properties hold if an external attacker enlarges distances between verifiers and an honest claimant. This basic intuition behind verifiable multilateration is illustrated in Figure 2a .
The verifiable multilateration algorithm is executed by the verifiers and by the authority as follows. ) of the position
Verifiable multilateration
if 17-1 > 0 then position is accepted and xu = s : , y, = y; else the position is rejected else the position is rejected
In step 1 of the algorithm, the verifiers 711, ..., ' U , which are in the power range of the claimant U perform distance bounding to the claimant U and obtain distance bounds dbl, ..., an.
These distance bounds as well as the positions of the verifiers (which are precisely known) are then reported to the authority.
In step 2, the authority computes an estimate (d,g') af the claimant's position; this position is computed by using distance bounds from all verifiers in U'S neighborhood, typically by the MMSE of the following system of equations: Point in the triangle test
The logic behind this test is the following. In this algorithm, the number of verification triangles and the number of enlarged distances will determine if the algorithm can detect which distance( s) Mare) enlarged. Nevertheless, in all cases, even if the number of verifiers is strictly equal to three, the Verifiabie Multilateration algorithm will detect any distance enlargement attack (even if only one distance is enlarged), but it will not always be able to detect which distance it is.
Verifiable Multilateration can be also applied to three dimensional positioning. For this, the system requires a minimum of four verifiers, that form a triangular pyramid, within which the secure determination of the claimant's position is possible. The algorithm is then executed in way similar to the two-dimensional case.
E. Properties
In this subsection, we summarize the most important properties of the Verifiable Multilateration mechanism. These are the following: 1) A node located at position p within the triangle/pyramid formed by the verifiers cannot prove to be at another position p' + p within the same trianglelpyramid.
2 ) A node located outside the triangle/pyramid formed by the verifiers cannot prove to be at any position p within the uianple/pyramid. where db, represents the distance between the verifier vi and node y.
Proof:
We observe the three circles Ci, Cj and ck with centers at vi, uj and q and radiuses dbiy, dbjP and dbkP respectively.
We assume that the three circles intersect itt a point p and that this point is in the lriangle A (vi,vj,wk pyramid moves at a different position within the pyramid, it will certainly reduce its distance to one of the verifiers.
C. Verifiable Midiilateratiorr with disiance estinration
Verifiable Multilateration can also be performed with authenticated distance estimation, instead of distance bounding. Authenticated distance estimation enables nodes to securely associate estimated distances to true node identities. A possible implementation of authenticated distance estimation is to base it on classical three-pass authentication protocols. If the nodes are tightly synchronized, they can measure the signal time of Ai@ to estimate their mutual distance. In the packets they send, nodes include timestamps of the times at which they sent the packets. Upon receiving a packet, each node registers the packet reception time. and estimates the distance based on the difference between the sending and the reception time. If the nodes' clocks are not tightly synchronized, but the nodes can measure time precisely. they can measure message rounduip times and processing times, and estimate their distance accordingly. The implementation of the authenticated distance estimation can be based on symmetric-key or publickey cryptography. depending whether the nodes share secret keys, or hold each others' authentic public keys.
If implemented with authenticaled distance estimation, VM offers protection only from external attackers, but not from compromised nodes. This is why it could be used only in cooperative scenarios in which the claimant and the verifiers cooperate to securely determine the position of the claimant. In the following sections, we will mainly make use of VM with distance bounding; at appropriate places, we will comment on the possible use of VM with distance estimation.
D. 7he threat of device cloning
With verifiable multilateration, an authority can prevent a single compromised node from cheating about its position.
However, if an attacker owns several devices and each device looks to the authority as the same node, the attacker can still successfully cheat on its position. One attack assumes that the attacker places threelfour devices within the triangleltrianpular pyramid, such that each device is close to one of the verifiers. Each of the devices can then show to its corresponding base station (by delaying the messages) that it is positioned at any distance larger than their actual distance (which is small). As to the base stations these devices appear to be a single claimant. the attacker can prove to be at any distance to the base stations, and thus at any position in the verification triangleltriangular pyramid.
A solution that prevents this attack is to make claimanr devices tamper-proof such that their authentication material is not revealed to the attacker and that they cannot be cloned; however, as shown in [ 131 tamper-proofness has its limitations. Another possibility is that the base stations perform device fingerprinting 1171 by which they identify each device as unique. In that case, the base stations can identify a claimant device by the unique "fingerprint" that characterizes its signal m r y transmission. This process is used by cellular network operators to prevent cloning fraud; namely, a cloned phone does not have the same fingerprint as the legal phone with the same electronic identification numbers.
E. Secure node trucking
One of the most direct applications of Verifiable Trilateration mechanism is the secure tracking of mobile devices. This can be enabled by creating a tracking infrastructure that consists of a set of verifiers, which can be fixed, with predetermined positions, or randomly distributed over the area of interest, or even mobile. For the simplicity of presentation, we will analyze this infrastructure in a two-dimensional case; the generalization to the three-dimensional case is straightforward,
The number of verifiers needed to cover an area. such that position verification can be performed in the whole area, depends on the number of verifiers and their (and mobile nodes') power ranges. So far, we have assumed that the power range of each verifier can cover the verification triangle and that the position verification is thus enabled in the whole triangle. This is, however, not true in general; the verification triangle is the largest possible region in which three verifiers can verify node positions, If the power ranges of the verifiers are such that they do not cover the whole triangle, the verification region can be significantly smaller than the verification triangle. Only if the verifiers are in each others' power ranges will the verification region be equal to the verification triangle. For this reason, the optimal way to cover an area of interest is to place the verifiers within the area such that they form regular triangles with sides equal to their power ranges. In this case, the number n of verifiers needed to cover a square area of L x L is
where L is the area width and length, R is the power range of the verifiers and mobile nodes, In this way, each verifier (except for the boundary verifiers) will be a verifier in six triangles (i.e., in a hexagon).
We now consider the case in which, instead of being predeployed on fixed locations. the verifiers are uniformly distributed over the area of interest. We performed simulations to determine [he number of verifiers necessary to cover the area. This coverage will depend on the sizes and the positions of the verification triangles formed by the verifiers. Our simulations were performed on areas of variable sizes (from 500 x 500 to 2000 x 3000 m2 with verifiers power ranges of 250 m). To avoid boundary effects, the verifiers were uniformly distributed in the area and in a boundary region outside the area, whose width was 10% of the area width.
The results of an average of 100 simulations are shown in Figure 3 and are displayed with confidence intervals of 95%. As expected, an optimal placement of verifiers is much more efficient than their random placement, in terms of number of nodes.
However, for security purposes, in some scenarios, it might be advantageous for the verifiers to be randomly placed, to randomly move within the area of interest and thus not to have their positions known at all times. Verifier mobility could also prevent the cloning attack and would facilitate the reconstruction of h e device trajectory. Furthermore. to reconstruct the trajectory of a node, the verifiers do not need to know the positions of the node at all times; the positions that are not verified can often be reconstructed from the known ones.
As we already noted, if the verifiers are placed only within the area of interest, because of the boundary effects, verification triangles cannot cover the whole intended area. Therefore, verifiers need to be distributed also around the boundaries outside of the area of interest. In the case of a carefully planned tracking infrastructure, the verifiers can be placed either outside of the area or exactly on its borders.
V. SPINE: SECURE POSITIONING 1~ SENSOR NETWORKS
One of the main challenges in sensor networks [MI, E191, [20] Figure 4, case a) .
2) Attacks 011 node positioning: Even without displacing the nodes, an external attacker can still perform a number of attacks on node positions and network topology. An example ofthis behavior is the uwmhole attack shown in Figure 4 
System model
Our system consists of a set of sensor nodes and a set of reference nodes (landmarks) with known locations. Nodes and verifiers communicate using radio transmissions. If two nodes reside within the power range of each other, they are considered neighbors. We assume that the radio link between neighbors is bidirectional. Nodes measure local information, which is then collected by the central authority. Communication between nodes may involve multiple wireIess hops; we do not make any specific assumptions about the routing protocol used to transfer packets from their source to their destination.
We assume that the sensor nodes have distance-measuring capabilities, but are not equipped with GPS receivers. We assume, notably. that the nodes are able to measure the distances to their neighbors or to the landmarks by using time-of-arrival or round-trip time measurements with radio signals. We also assume that the nodes are able to bound their processing delays to a few nanoseconds.
We assume that the network is operated by an authority. This authority can be on-line, meaning that the authority operates on-line servers (by single hop or multi-hop communication), or off-line. meaning that the services of the authority cannot be reached via the network. In any case, the authority controls the network membership and assigns a unique identity to each node. We further assume that each node is able generally to accomplish any task required to secure its communications.
We do not assume, however, that the nodes are able to generate or verify public-key signatures. We assume that all network nodes can establish pairwise secret keys. This can be achieved by manually pre-loading all keys into the nodes in a network setup phase, by probabilistic key pre-distribution schemes 1221, [23] . or through an on-line key distribution center [ll] .
C. SPINE algorithm
Our secure positioning algorithm (SPINE) is based on Verifiable Multilateration. The algorithm is executed in three phases: (i) the sensors measure distance bounds to their neighbors.
(ii) the distance bounds are verified through verifiable multilateration and (iii) the positions of the nodes are computed with a distributed or centralized range-based positioning algorithm. We note here that sensor distance bounding can be performed simultaneously between two sensors; a protocol that enables this was proposed by eapkun. Buttyan and Hubaux in [24] .
The algorithm is executed as follows. Figure 5; ( . u~, v5,v6) is formed around both U and ti. After forming the triangles, the measured distance bounds db,, (from U to U ) and db,, (from U to U ) are verified in all triangles, by performing verifiable multilateration over U and 21, respectively. This is done in such a way that the nodes forming a triangle define a local coordinate system, in which they then compute the position of U or U , or the positions of both U and v. The computation of the position of U and U is performed with verifiable multilateration through which the it is necessary that the network is sufficiently dense to ensure that the positions of most nodes can be securely computed.
To show the difference between the density requirements for secure and non-secure positioning, we observe an average number of distance bounds to the neighbors that can be verified with BDV (the distances that are used for secure positioning), and an average number of node neighbors (the distances used for non-secure positioning). We performed simulations on an area of 100 x 100m. with 50 to 500 uniform randomly distributed nodes with power ranges of 25 m. The results are presented in Figure 6 with 95% confidence intervals.
As expected, the results show that to perform secure positioning equivalently to non-secure positioning (meaning with approximately the same number of distances), a higher density of nodes is required. For non-secure positioning, the average of 10 distances per node (I0 neighbors) is reached already with SO nodes/I00 x 100 m2, whereas for secure positioning, the average of 10 verifiable distances requires at least 110 nodes/IOO x 100 m2. We further computed the average percentage of nodes covered by at least one verification triangle. These results are shown in Figure 7 . This figure is important as it shows that at node density of 120 nodedl00 x 100 m2, most of the nodes are covered by at least one verification triangle, meaning that their adjacent distances and their position can be verified. As expected, the figure shows that the boundary nodes are not covered by verification triangles. This is an important indication that the landmark stations need to be specifically ptaced at the boundaries of the area to protect boundary nodes from attacks by enabling the formation of verification triangles around them.
D. Securit)' analssis
The resistance of SPINE relies on the resistance of BDV to attacks; it depends on the ability of the attacker to modify the verified distances, but also depends on the positioning algorithm used to compute node positions with verified distances.
Here. we primarily analyze the resistance of BDV to attacks. We then discuss security implications of using BDV with several positioning algorithms.
The resistance of RDV to attacks depends on the number and on the mutual dependance of triangles that are formed around the distance. To spoof a distance verified by a single triangle. it is sufficient that an external attacker enlarges two distances (the distance &,, and one additional distance between the nodes forming a triangle). This is illustrated on Figure 8 , where distances d, , and d l are enlarged. By enlarging these two distances, all the distances in the verification triangle remain mutually consistent. This attack can be performed by an external attacker.
If only a single node in a triangle is compromised, this node can enlarge distances to the claimant and to other nodes forming the verification triangle. This is illustrated on Figure 9 . In this example, node v is compromised, and enlarges distances to U. va and to u3 such that all the distances in the verification triangle remain mutualIy consistent. Similarly to the attack on Figure 8 , if an attacker controls one compromised and one external node, it can enlarge the measured distance even if the compromised node is no1 adjacent to the distance.
This essentially means that a single-triangle BDV resists only to attacks that enlarge only a single distance.
If k verification triangles can be formed around a distance, the resistance of BDV to attacks can be expressed in terms of k. If the triangles are node-disjoint, then BDV resists to up to 2k distance enlargements. This is intuitive, as the distance is verified by k disjoint triangles. and an attacker needs to spoof the verification process in each of the triangles to successful cheat on the measured distance.
If the triangles are node-joint and edge-disjoint, then BDV also resists to up to 2k distance enlargements by external attackers. but it does not resist attacks by a single compromised node adjacent to the spoofed distance. Essentially, if all triangles have a common (compromised) node, the distance adjacent to that node can be successfully spoofed. We note here. however, that the triangles formed around a distance are almost never node-joint, given that some are formed with U and its neighbors around ' U, others are formed with U and its neighbors around w.. whereas the third set of triangles is formed by the neighbors of U and v around the two nodes.
If the triangles are edge-joint, then BDV resists to up to k + l distance enlargements by external attackers. If the nodes are positioned favorably for the attacker, the attacker can enlarge the joint edge and enlarge one additional edge from every triangle. We note here that this attack will not always be possible,
We performed simulations on a network of sensors with densities from 50 to 500 nodes/100 x 100 m2 and a power range of 25 m. We computed the average number of verification triangles and an average number of edge-disjoint verification triangles that can be formed around a distance. The results show that BDV, depending on the node density and node positions, can resist to attacks up to 100 distance enlargements.
To compromise the computation of the position of a single node, an attacker needs to modify the computation and the verification of the (verified) distances surrounding the node. Furthermore, the attacker needs to make all the modified distances and positions consistent with the positions of other nodes in the network. The difficulty for the attacker here is in distance enlargement. Essentially, when the attacker enlarges distances, it makes some nodes to appear further from each other. but also makes some unavoidably to appear closer. This is why in a very dense network, the attacker could only scaleup all the distances in the network, but it would not be able to, by changing a smaller number of distances, successfully modify the computed positions of the nodes.
E. Disciission
SPINE is designed for both centralized and for distributed secure positioning. As a core part of SPINE, BDV relies solely on local communication between the nodes. All the triangles are formed within the local neighborhoods of the nodes. It is important to observe that the nodes that form a verification triangle are in each others' power ranges. In this work, we have analyzed positioning and distance estimation techniques in adversarial settings. We have shown that most proposed positioning techniques are vulnerable to position spoofing attacks from external attackers and compromised nodes. We have further shown that positioning and distance estimation techniques based on radio signal propagation exhibit the best properties for position verification. We have proposed a novel mechanism for position verification, called Verifiable Multilateration (VM). Verifiable Multilateration enables secure computation and verification of node positions in the presence of attackers. We have further proposed SPINE. a system for secure positioning in a network of sensors, based on Verifiable Multilateration. We have shown that this system resists against distance modification attacks from a large number of attacker nodes.
Our future work includes a detailed analysis and possible implementation of distance bounding and position verification techniques. Furthermore, we intend to investigate the applicability of our basic distance verification scheme to a number of existing positioning algorithm.
